Conservative author Carney (commentary writer for the Washington Examiner) has researched community stability to understand why certain demographics voted for a candidate whose message was "the American dream is dead". He asserts that the American dream is not wealth but social capital: that is, those institutions of civil society, that connect us, eg, the kids' soccer team, the book club, the local church. Carney notes that Trump led in rural areas and sectors where people were civically disengaged" - unemployed, divorced, poor, or unchurched. He tapped into their frustration. Thus, Trump's support came not only from areas where factories were closing, but where churches were closing. Carney asserts that place determines more about how a person votes than how well individuals are faring. Differences between places are not only wealth and education but of health, hope and opportunity.
Carney harks back to the US in the mid-1950s - a time of greater equality, good jobs for all (white and blue collar alike), 90% of adults married by age 30, most attending church, many opportunities to participate in community (bowling league, labor unions, local athletic club). By the late 1950s, however, Europe is back on its feet (after the war) and producing its own steel (and other manufactured products) to compete with the US and bring prices down and inventory up. Yet Pittsburgh, for example, adapted both to foreign competition and environmental regulations and regrew a strong economy thought jobs in finance, health sector and retail. It is not the manufacturing failure Trump liked to tout, but a white collar success. So where do Trump's claims come from?
Carney believes that symptoms of poor well-being include
1) A retreat from marriage. The well-off and well educated and those with the most stable jobs (even factory jobs if pay is decent) tend to produce more marriageable men. Asserting that community/social capital sustains marriage, Carney says "the erosion of community is what killed the norm of marriage in the working class" (p 86).
2) Social disintegration. When a factory closes (e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube in 1977) it's not just the thousands of jobs - but also the grocery store, gas station, restaurants and barber shops that lose their business. Many Trumpers wanted to bring back the past (e.g., Little League, parades, shuttered churches) - while those with strong communities, like wealthy Chevy Chase MD and religious Oostburg MI, still have those entities.
3) Society's collapse is largely about church, America's preeminent institution. Traditionally, churches have provided great benefits to members in caring for others (helping to provide food, serve as a community center, etc) but that government overreach has made church irrelevant and people attend less because govt provides for these needs. Not only those who were helped - but also those who served - attend less as they feel they are no longer needed.
Carney also feels that the "gig economy" (Uber drivers, grocery delivery persons, etc) adds to loss of community as there is no common workplace and we thus feel isolated. "When you strengthen the vertical bonds between the state and the individual, you tend to weaken the horizontal bonds between individuals", he states.
In chapter 10 "The Alienated" Carney asserts "the story of how we got Trump is the story of collapse of community, which is also the story behind our opioid plague, labor force dropouts, retreat from marriage and our growing inequality." Why do vets like Trump? They are lonely and missing the camaraderie of active duty; Trump rallies seemed to agree with them that the American dream is dead. There is a human need to belong. Take away church or clubs or college - and Trump fills the void. In Trump country - even if expressions of religiosity are high - churches are empty.
As to "elites" - the liberal elites practice what we [conservatives] preach. They value work as a good in itself, they have fewer sex partners, they get married, they have kids, they get involved in their kids' lives. But they lack the courage to preach what they practice. They are selfish. They want to keep the secrets of the good life (go to school, get a job, get married, have kids, get involved in your kids' lives) to themselves, per Carney.
But it is the secularization of America, Carney feels, that is most responsible for the rise of Trump.
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While I can appreciate, as Carney asserts, that there are areas of economic and social collapse where people felt left out and that they had a sympathizer in Trump, I believe this is just part of the picture - especially with regard to the role of church. I have never felt that the local church is there to provide economic relief. True - my church has chipped in to fill someone's oil tank (and not necessarily for a church member), the ladies of the church have brought a month's worth of suppers to hundreds of families whose mom is recovering from surgery or just gave birth, church networking has led to many job opportunities. A friend's church (in the inner-city) provides a free food pantry and laundry facilities for those in need - still church is about worship and fellowship rather than providing food and financial recovery, and I do not feel that govt programs like SNAP or HUD have usurped my church's role.
In blaming the elites for keeping the secret to success (go to school, get a job, get married, have kids, get involved in your kids' lives) to themselves - these are not "secrets" but long held principles.
Finally, most of my Trump-supporting friends DO attend church, they live in thriving communities, they are lovely people who say Trump's anti-abortion stance is the appeal, and that it outweighs the words and behavior I find so antithetical to Jesus' call on our lives. Scripture advises us to reach out to the foreigner, to those in prisons, to the widow and orphan; to forgive, to avoid adultery, to reject lying, to honor one another...
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